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Abstract
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large
quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have
suggested for different data providers to pool their data together to learn a unified predictive model, which
performs better. However, these providers are usually profit-driven and would only agree to participate in
the data sharing process if the process is deemed both profitable and fair for themselves. Due to the lack
of existing literature, it is unclear whether a fair and stable outcome is possible in such data sharing pro-
cesses. Hence, we wish to investigate the outcomes surrounding these scenarios and study if data providers
would even agree to collaborate in the first place. Tapping on cooperative game concepts in Game Theory,
we introduce the data sharing process between a group of agents as a new class of cooperative games
with modified definition of stability and fairness. Using these new definitions, we then theoretically study
the optimal and suboptimal outcomes of such data sharing processes and their sensitivity to perturbation.
Through experiments, we present intuitive insights regarding theoretical results analysed in this paper and
discuss various ways in which data can be valued reasonably.
Subject Descriptors:
Game Theory
Mechanism Design
Machine Learning
Keywords: Multi-party Machine Learning, Cooperative Games, Game Theory, Shapley Value, Charac-
teristic Function
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of work done in the field of collaborative machine
learning. As massive amount of data is held by different data providers, it becomes worthwhile for them to
work together, possibly combining these datasets to learn a unified predictive model. Each data provider
can then ideally make use of this model, which arguably performs better than any model created from
small individual dataset. In fact, the importance of pooling data together from multiple sources has been
underscored by various public initiatives such as the Ocean Protocol framework (created jointly by Price-
waterhousecoopers Singapore and Singapore-based startup DEX). From the point of view of a central
agency, such as the government, data sharing is desirable because citizens, businesses and society stand to
benefit from better predictive models in general.
Most work on collaborative machine learning in a multi-agent setting then focuses on parallelizing the
process of learning a predictive model from decentralized data sources. However, there has been little
to no work focused on evaluating the relative contribution of agents and investigating the outcomes sur-
rounding such collaborative processes. In particular, we wish to investigate if we can measure each agent’s
relative contribution reasonably and find a sufficiently fair reward to allocate to each player so that they
are satisfied with the collaborative process.
Figure 1: Overview of data sharing process and this paper’s focus
The first challenge arises in terms of evaluating the contribution of each agent in a multi-party machine
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learning process - when data is jointly pooled from multiple sources to create a unified model, what is
the relative contribution of each agent in the collaborative effort? Answering this question is paramount
because the reward each agent walks away from collaboration heavily depends on his relative contribu-
tion.
The next challenge arises after one has established the relative contribution of each agent in the collabo-
rative process - given this contribution measure, how can we reward the participating agents appropriately
after collaboration (the concept of ’reward’ here refers to the value of the resulting model that each agent
receives after collaborating)? While the reward given to an agent should clearly commensurate his contri-
bution (fair), it should also be attractive enough to ensure agents are incentivised to continue collaborating
(stable). We need to investigate if such fair and stable allocation of reward is even possible given the data
contributed by each agent, and if not, what possible alternatives are available. To contextualise the above
challenges, we introduce the following motivating example.
1.1 A motivating example behind fair multi-party machine learning
Artificial intelligence has shown great promise in healthcare for many applications such as tumour detec-
tion and the diagnosis of eye diseases. However, much of its performance is dependent on the availability
of sufficient high quality data. Assume a government healthcare agency wants hospitals to use patients’
Figure 2: BioMind, developed by AI Research Centre for Neurological Disorders and Capital Medical
University, beat human experts in a brain tumour detection competition in June 2018
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MRI 1 scans to create a model for automatic tumour detection. However, data held by individual hospital
may be insufficient to produce a good model. From the point of view of the government, it is desirable
for all the hospitals to pool their data to create a unified model - this implies that patients enjoy better
predictive results. However in reality, hospitals are profit-driven and will only agree to participate if the
following two criteria are met: first, a hospital wants the reward gained from the collaborative effort to be
higher than any possible reward derived when it chooses to work alone or with a smaller group of hospi-
tals. Second, a hospital expects the reward received to be fair and proportional to its relative contribution
at the end of the collaboration. The differing level of reward here refers to the predictive model (of varying
performance) that is given back to the hospitals.
The first criterion stems directly from the profit-driven aim of hospitals - a better predictive model implies
that a hospital can make more profits and thus clearly it prefers to gain more profits from collaboration
than from other actions (one may find this similar to the idea of opportunity cost). On the other hand,
the second criteria implies that hospitals holding high quality data, worried that smaller hospitals with
relatively inferior data may become freeloader in the collaborative process, expects the reward given to be
fair.
As a result, the central agency needs to find a sound way to measure the contribution of each hospital
in the collaborative process and decide the value of model that should be given to each hospital after
collaborating. In particular, it is important to investigate what defines an optimal outcome, if an optimal
outcome is even possible and if not, what alternatives are possible. This motivates our paper.
1.2 Our contribution and research focus
This paper taps heavily on concepts related to cooperative games in Game Theory. Our research focus in
this paper lies strongly in the theoretical representation of a multi-party machine learning process as a new
class of cooperative game with new definitions of stability and fairness. After which, we analyse various
optimal and suboptimal outcomes in such games and show how some of these outcomes can be derived.
1Magnetic resonance imaging
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These outcomes provide insights into how data providers behave in a multi-party machine learning process
and allow us to theoretically investigate if the collaboration will be successful and give desirable results.
In Section 3, we provide a brief overview of cooperative games in Game Theory and show that con-
ventional cooperative games are unable to account for some unique subtleties present in data sharing and
other similar processes. In Section 4 and 5, we modify conventional assumptions in cooperative games
to account for this and introduce a new class of cooperative game with the production of non-rivalrous
goods; we also redefine the concept of stability and fairness in such games by tapping on the conventional
concept of Shapley value in Game Theory. In Section 6, we introduce a computationally efficient way
to check if an outcome of a modified game is stable and investigate how an outcome can be optimal. In
Section 7, We also analyse various suboptimal outcomes in a data sharing process. Lastly, in Section 8,
we perform sensitivity analysis to analyse how sensitive an optimal outcome is towards marginal changes
in the data sharing process.
We also perform a series of experiments in Section 9 using two different model valuation measures and
demonstrate some results from previous sections.
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2 Related Work
Literature review reveals that while the study of fairness in the domain of data sharing and collaborative
learning has become popular in recent years, most work has focused solely on evaluating the contribution
of data providers in a data sharing process or treating the process as non-cooperative. In addition, none of
existing works analyses how a fair and stable outcome can be derived after evaluating the data providers’
contribution.
The use of Shapley value [11], a classic concept stemming from cooperative game, as an evaluation mea-
sure of one’s contribution in data sharing processes [3, 13] has become increasingly popular in recent
years. However, these works focus on alleviating the computational complexities in calculating the Shap-
ley value with respect to agents’ data; while the usage of Shapley value in these works is similar to ours,
they do not comment on how one can derive an optimal reward payoff to participating data providers after
finding the shapley value, which our work does. Moreover, these works also fail to point out that a data
sharing process contains subtleties which deviate from conventional cooperative games, which our paper
examines in Section 4.
Furthermore, works such as [12, 14] attempt to formulate the data sharing process as a non-cooperative
game, where each participating player contributes data to create a unified predictive model. However,
such non-cooperative game rewards each participating players with the same model at the end of the
game, which violates our aim to endow players with a reward commensurate to his contribution. More-
over, non-cooperative games fails to account for the possibility of group cooperation between players,
which not only is more realistic in real life, but also examines the idea of fair division of reward at the end
of the game.
Some existing literature [9, 13] also remarked that participating players could receive the same model
and be renumerated with varying amount of money after data sharing. However, it is uncertain how to
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determine the ”exchange rate” between data contribution and money and some surveys [1] mentioned that
people feel that data and money are not exchangeable. On the contrary, our work focuses on distributing
a subset of the learnt model (with value commensurating the player’s contribution to this learnt model)
back to participating players directly; this is desirable because as long as we defined the ”value” of a learnt
model appropriately using some theoretical measures, the players’ reward (in the form of a learnt model)
can be directly pegged to this ”value”.
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3 Background on cooperative games
In Game Theory, cooperative games provide a framework for economists and mathematicians to study
how a group of self-interested players chooses to behave when they are allowed to cooperate with each
other to generate some resources of value. Despite being self-interested, these players may still choose to
cooperate because there may be positive externalities created when larger groups are formed. However,
it is not always the case that all players choose to cooperate in one single large group; depending on the
resources created and the amount of positive externalities generated, it is entirely possible that we observe
multiple smaller coalition of players forming. In fact, this is what we observe in real life: business coop-
eration usually exists between only a few corporations. However, our paper considers it desirable for all
players to cooperate and show that under certain optimality conditions, they will choose to do so.
Much analysis in cooperative games then focuses on what coalitions will form and how the resources
generated in such coalitions can be divided amongst the participating players (termed as outcomes of the
game). In the following sections, we will formally define such cooperative games [7] and investigate
how such definitions can be interpreted in the context of a multi-party machine learning process. Subse-
quently, we identify how conventional cooperative game concepts fail to represent the data sharing process
adequately and suggest modifications.
3.1 Defining a cooperative game with a characteristic function
Assume that N represents a set of n players. Define v : 2n −→ R as a characteristic function. A charac-
teristic function maps any coalition C ⊆ N , or a subset of players, to a real number which represents the
value that is generated when this coalition of player chooses to work together.
In the context of multi-party machine learning, we can imagine that when players choose to work to-
gether (in the form of data sharing) to create a model from the pooled data, this model represents the value
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created by a coalition of players; the characteristic function v(.) can be certain statistical or information-
centric metric used to indicate the value of such models. Furthermore, one can even use the model’s
performance over a test data set as an indicator of its value.
In fact, various analyses in this paper make no assumptions of the exact characteristic function used in
a data sharing process. However, towards the end of the paper, we justify the use of certain functions
over others. As we will see from experiments in section 9, there are many different interpretations of
characteristic functions and they lead to different outcomes.
3.1.1 Outcomes of cooperative games
An outcome of a cooperative game with n players and a given characteristic function v(.) is characterised
entirely by the following two parts:
1. a partition of players into different coalitions, called a coalition structure; and
2. a payoff vector < x1, ..., xn >, which distributes the value of each coalition among its members∑
i∈C xi ≤ v(C) for all coalition C formed in the coalition structure.
The first part tells us which coalitions will be formed; the second part tells us that for each coalition formed
in the first part, how value created in this coalition is divided amongst the players in it. In particular, we
notice that second part implies that the sum of payoff distributed to members of a coalition cannot exceed
the value generated by this coalition; for example, when a group of firms work together to generate some
profits, the payment given to all the firms in total cannot exceed the profit generated in the first place.
For any given cooperative game, there are many possible outcomes. Fundamental research in cooperative
game theory focuses on finding outcomes with certain desirable or logical properties. In the following
section, we review some desirable properties in which an outcome of a conventional cooperative game can
have, assuming that all players choose to cooperate together. While the definition of these properties will
be modified later on in our paper, the intuitive meaning behind these properties is still relevant.
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3.1.2 Stability and Core
Assuming that the grand coalition N forms and all participating players choose to cooperate, a stable
outcome ensures that any player does not have incentive to leave this grand coalition. In the context of
multi-party machine learning, this property is desirable because it encourages players to share data in a
larger coalition to create a unified model instead of breaking off into smaller groups.
Definition 1. Let < x1, x2, ..., xn > be a payoff vector to players 1,2,...,n. Then this payoff vector is stable
if and only if
∑
i∈C xi ≥ v(C) for all C ⊆ N .
Intuitively, an outcome is stable if the reward received by each player at the end is such that no subset of
players can simultaneously break off into smaller sub-coalitions which generate higher rewards than the
sum of payment each player earns from the current reward. As the name suggests, one can interpret sta-
bility as some kind of equilibrium for the players, where there is no incentive for anyone to take deviating
actions.
In conventional cooperative games, the set of all stable solution payoffs is called the Core. Notice that
deriving the stable set of solution consists of finding the feasible region satisfying 2n constraints (by
Definition 1). Hence, the Core does not necessarily exist.
3.1.3 Shapley value
On the other hand, when we divide the value created in the grand coalition N to the participating players
in a payoff vector, we also wish to capture the notion of fairness in this outcome. While the notion is
”fairness” is not captured in any one single definition, it can be represented reasonably by a few different
properties.
In cooperative games, the shapley value derives a payoff vector< φ1, φ2, . . . , φn > based on each player’s
marginal contribution to all possible sub-coalitions in the following equation, given that v(.) is the char-
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acteristic function:
φi =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! (N − |S| − 1)!
N !
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)) (1)
This payoff vector satisfies the following properties which capture the notion of ”fairness” intuitively:
1. Symmetry; if v(C ∪ i)− v(C) = v(C ∪ j)− v(C) for all C ⊆ N , then φi = φj . That is, if player i
and player j has the same marginal contribution to every possible coalition of players, then φi = φj
2. Null player; if v(C ∪ i) = v(C) for all C ⊆ N , then φi = 0. That is, if player i has zero marginal
contribution to any subcoalition, then φi = 0
3. Deservedness if v(C ∪ i) ≤ v(C ∪ j) for all C ⊆ N , then φi ≤ φj . That is, if player j has a larger
marginal contribution than player i for all possible subcoalitions, then φi ≤ φj .
4. Efficiency;
∑n
i φi = v(N).
The last property is important because it allows one to interpret the shapley value as a measure of relative
contribution with respect to the value of resources created by the grand coalition. In particular, it is not
difficult to see that the shapley value gives us one particular outcome (as defined in Section 3.1.1) of a co-
operative game by allocating the value created by the grand coalitions to a player with the properties above.
Unfortunately, the allocation given by the Shapley value may not be stable in conventional cooperative
games (since a stable solution may not even exist). In later sections, we will observe the recurring theme
where fairness and stability may not be achievable together.
3.1.4 Limitations in context of data sharing
Even though we are tempted to model the data sharing process as a cooperative game and regard the
combined learnt model as the value generated by a group of players, we observe that under conventional
game theory, the ideal outcomes (based on conventional concepts of stability and fairness) of such games
are less than desirable and do not promote sharing of data. For example, imagine if two agents A and B
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whose datasets are valued in the following manner:
v(A) = 1
v(B) = 1
v(A ∪B) = 2
(2)
Based on conventional outcomes studied in cooperative game theory, if the players choose to collaborate,
the only stable solution payoff is xA, xB = 1, 1. Furthermore, the shapley value gives us φA, φB = 1, 1
as well. But clearly, since players are producing predictive models, which can be duplicated for free, we
should be rewarding both players with the payoff xA, xB = 2, 2 (notice we did not create resources from
the thin air, but merely duplicated them).
We first try to understand why this happens. In example (2), the shapley value explains the contribu-
tion of each player well: it seems correct that both players have contributed to v(A∪B) equally. However,
we observe that, unlike conventional cooperative games, predictive models created from the data sharing
process can be duplicated in part or entirely for negligible cost. As such, we do not have to restrict our
total payoff to a coalition of players such that it sums to the value of one data model. In fact, in the ex-
treme case, we can distribute the same entire learnt model to each player, regardless of how much they
contributed to it (of course, this payoff is not fair). As such, the shapley value should merely give us an
idea of what the relative contribution of each player is, and not dictate the final division of reward to each
player.
In the following section, we will modify conventional assumptions surrounding cooperative games to
suit a multi-party machine learning data-sharing process and analyse what can be ideal outcomes in such
modified games. In particular, we observe that the model created by coalitions in a data-sharing process
can be categorised as a non-rivalrous good, where players can enjoy part of it without diminishing its
availability to other players. Furthermore, we use the Shapley value merely as a measure of contribution
between the players and not as an indicator of the reward that should be allocated to each of them.
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4 Deviating from conventional cooperative games
4.1 Overview
We wish to capture the notion that resources created are non-rivalrous in our modified game. In fact, each
player can receive as high as the total value created by the group. However, the central agency mediating
the collaborative process is able to control the level of reward given to any player. To do this, we need to
redefine what a payoff vector is.
Definition 2. In a modified game, a payoff vector < x1, x2, ..., xn > to a coalition structure is such that
for all coalitions C belonging to the coalition structure formed, xi ≤ v(C) for any player i ∈ C.
Compared to the definition of payoff vector in Section 3.1.1, this new definition restricts the payment to
a coalition of players such that each player cannot receive more than the value created in this coalition.
Notice this is different from conventional cooperative games, which dictate that the sum of payments
received by all the players cannot exceed the value created in a coalition.
The data sharing process can now be represented entirely by this modified game with a new definition of
payoff vector in an outcome. However, changing this single definition leads to a myriad of effects on the
concept of stability, fairness and outcome, which will be covered in the subsequent sections.
4.2 Alternative definition of stability
Under this modified game, the original definition of stability (Definition 1) no longer ensures that a payoff
vector is stable. For example, for a three-player game with the following characteristic function defining
the value of models created in various coalitions:
v(A) = 1, v(B) = 1, v(C) = 1
v(A ∪B) = 2, v(A ∪ C) = 2, v(B ∪ C) = 2
v(A ∪B ∪ C) = 3
(3)
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A payoff vector < xA, xB, xC >=< 1.5, 1.5, 1.5 > would have been stable according to Definition 1
because it is easily verifiable the sum of payoffs to any subset of players exceed the value created by them.
However, in a modified game where resources created by a coalition can be duplicated for free, player A
and player B, for example, can choose to leave the grand coalition and work together to both earn a payoff
of higher than 1.5 (Since they can pool their data together in subcoalition A ∪ B to potentially create a
model of value 2 and earn a payoff < xA, xB >=< 2, 2 >). Thus, the original definition of stability fails
for our modified game.
We redefine, in an intuitive way, the definition of stability in a modified game:
Definition 3. In a modified game where the grand coalition N of n players forms, a payoff vector <
x1, x2, ..., xn > is stable if and only if for any subcoalitions C ⊆ N , there exists a player k ∈ C such that
xk ≥ v(C)
An intuitive way to understand this definition is that players in the grand coalition are only satisfied with
their current reward if there are no subcoalitions where a subset of players can choose to form privately
and simultaneously earn a higher reward. As such, considering that the maximum payoff one can earn
in any subcoalition is the value created by the subcoalition itself, there must be at least one player in
every possible subcoalition C who is contented with his current payoff under the grand coalition (i.e
xk ≥ v(C)), preventing that subcoalition of players from deviating privately (since the refusal of a single
player is sufficient to prevent a group of players from deviating together).
4.3 Definition of proportionality
In Section 3, we introduced how the Shapley value derives a payoff vector φ(N) =< φ1, φ2, ..., φn >
=< x1, x2, . . . , xn > (assuming all n players work together in coalition N ) which dictates how the value
generated from the grand coalition should be divided amongst its members to maintain some fair proper-
ties. In fact, the shapley value indicates the level of contribution of each member with respect to the model
created of value v(N).
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However, in a modified game, Definition 2 places bounds on the payoff to individual players instead on the
sum of payoffs. We can scale the vector φ(N) by a positive constant α such that the resulting payoff vector
< x1, . . . , xn >= αφ(N) preserves the ratio of contribution between each player. Here, we introduce the
concept of proportionality to categorise any payoff vector satisfying the following property:
Definition 4. A payoff vector < x1, x2, . . . , xn > is proportional for a given contribution measure vector
C ∈ Rn if and only if there exists a positive constant α such that < x1, x2, . . . , xn >= αC.
In the rest of the paper, we will assume the shapley value as our contribution measure because a payoff
vector proportional to the shapley value preserves its desirable properties covered in Section 3.1.3.
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5 Desirable properties of outcomes in modified cooperative game
Recall that an outcome of a cooperative game is defined by the resulting coalition structure formed and
payoff vector defined over the coalitions in the coalition structure (Section 3.1.1). Some outcomes satisfy
certain desirable properties in data sharing. Here, we summarise these properties.
Given a modified game with a group of n players, a characteristic function v(.) used to measure the value of
predictive model created by the data sharing process and the subsequent shapley value < φ1, φ2, ..., φn >
derived as the contribution measure, we want an outcome consisting of a coalition structure S and payoff
vector < x1, x2, . . . , xn > to have the following properties:
1. Formation of grand coalition coalition structure S consists of a single grand coalition with n
players. That is, all players choose to cooperate in the data sharing process.
2. Stability (Definition 3) All players continue to collaborate in a large group.
3. Fairness
(a) Proportionality (Definition 4) Players receive reward proportional to his relative contribution.
(b) Null Player If φi = 0, then xi = 0; a player with no contribution gets zero reward.
(c) Symmetry If φi = φj , then xi = xj; two players with equal contribution receives equal reward.
(d) Order Preserving If φi > φj , then xi > xj; if player i has a lower contribution than player j,
then player i’s reward is lower than that of player j.
The rest of this paper investigates whether an outcome satisfying all the above properties (regarded as
optimal) exists and other suboptimal outcomes.
5.1 Assumptions of modified cooperative game
Before we formalise the definition of an optimal outcome, we make the following basic assumptions
regarding our modified game:
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1. We assume that characteristic function v(.) used to value predictive models is monotonic. That is,
if C ⊆ C ′, then v(C) ≤ v(C ′); this assumption implies that the value (as valued by the charac-
teristic function) of the model generated by the largest group of players N is also the largest. This
assumption implies that larger coalition generates more value than smaller ones.
2. We use the shapley value, as defined in Section 3.1.3, as the relative contribution measure C to
gauge a player’s contribution in the data sharing process. As mentioned, the shapley value has
many desirable properties.
With these assumptions, we introduce a general algorithm to determine the reward allocated to each player
in a modified cooperative game. This algorithm will be used by a central agency who receives the data
from all participating players.
Algorithm 1: Data-sharing and reward division
Input: Datasets of n players D1, D2, . . . , Dn, characteristic function v : 2n 7→ R
Output: rewards x1, x2, . . . , xn
1 φ← shapley(v(.), D1, D2, . . . , Dn);
2 if getOptimalOutcome(φ, v) 6= None then
x1, x2, . . . , xn ← getOptimalOutcome(φ, v);
return x1, x2, . . . , xn
3 else
x1, x2, . . . , xn ← getSuboptimalOutcome(φ, v);
return x1, x2, . . . , xn
In the following sections, we analyse how functions getOptimalOutcome and getSuboptimalOutcome
derive optimal and suboptimal outcomes. The central agency can use these results to allocate rewards for
the participating players.
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6 Optimal outcome
To contextualise an optimal outcome in our modified game to a description of a real-life data-sharing pro-
cess, imagine n data providers come together to create a predictive model from the pooled data. Then
using a monotonic characteristic function v(.) to measure the value of the predictive model, we are able to
derive the relative contributions of the players with the Shapley value. Subsequently, an optimal outcomes
corresponds to a reward payoff for the players such that they have no incentives to break away from the
grand coalition and the reward also commensurates each player’s relative contribution. In this section, we
investigate how we can find this optimal outcome efficiently.
We consider an outcome to a modified game optimal if they satisfy all properties in the Section 5. Hence,
the task of finding an optimal outcome becomes one of finding the feasible region of the division of re-
wards to the players < x1, x2, . . . , xn > such that all desirable properties are satisfied. However, this
is computationally inefficient because the definition of stability alone implies that we need to check 2n
constraints. Fortunately, we show, in the following proposition, that the set of stable solution payoffs can
be found by checking only n constraints, given that the characteristic function v(.) is monotonic.
Proposition 5. Stable Solution Set Given a monotonic valuation function v(.), let < x1, x2, ..., xn > be
a payoff vector to n agents, arranged in ascending order. Then this payoff vector is stable if and only if
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
xi ≥ v(
⋃
j≤i
j) (4)
Proof. if ∀i, xi ≥ v(
⋃
j≤i j), then for any sub coalition C
′ containing a subset of agents, the agent in C ′
with the largest index (we refer to this index as k) would be such that xk ≥ v(
⋃
j≤k j). Since k is the
largest index in C ,, it follows that C ′ ⊆ ⋃j≤k j and because of our assumption that v(.) is monotonic, we
have xk ≥ v(
⋃
j≤k j) ≥ v(C
′
). Thus by definition of stability, the payoff vector < x1, ..., xn > is stable.
Conversely, if the payoff vector is stable, then by definition, for all index k and for every subcoalition⋃
j≤k j, there exists at least one agent with payoff larger than v(
⋃
j≤k j). Since, xk is the highest payoff
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received in this subcoalition (because we rearranged the payoff index in ascending order), we have xk ≥
v(
⋃
j≤k j) for all k.
This theorem implies that to ensure players are rewarded such that they have no incentive to break off and
form smaller private coalitions, their reward must be larger than the value of model created by the union
of all players with less or equal contribution as him. This is a simple definition but also an extremely
important one because it allows us to define the space of rewards such that no players are incentivised to
break off from the grand coalition.
Figure 3: Visualisation of Proposition 5. Lining up the players in ascending contribution, the payoff xi to
each player must be larger than the value created by the union of previous players to ensure stability.
With the above proposition on finding the stable solution set, it is then natural for us refine this stable set
with properties related to fairness to define an optimal outcome:
Theorem 6. Optimal outcome Given a monotonic valuation function v(.) with the value created by grand
coalition equals v(N), let < x1, x2, ..., xn > be a solution payoff to n agents, arranged in ascending order
and < φ1, φ2, ..., φn > be the relative contribution of the agents of the same index. Then this solution
payoff is stable and proportional if and only if ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
xi = φi
v(N)
φn
≥ v(
⋃
j≤i
j) (5)
An outcome with such a solution payoff is then said to be optimal.
Proof. In a stable solution, the player with the highest index receives a payoff xn ≥ v(
⋃
j≤n j) = v(N)
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by definition of stability. This implies that the agent receiving the highest payoff must receive v(N). By
observation, for the solution to be proportional, this agent also has the highest contribution φn and thus
every other agent i has its contribution φi scaled by a factor of
v(N)
φn
. The inequality follows naturally in
order to abide to the condition of stability.
Now, since the shapley value is used as the relative contribution measure, the proportional and stable
solution payoff inherits other fairness properties: Null Player, Symmetry, Order Preserving. As such,
an outcome with such a solution payoff satisfies all properties in Section 5 and is optimal.
Theorem 6 gives us an optimal outcome of a multi-agent data sharing process formulated as a modified
cooperative game. Intuitively, this theorem tells us that an optimal reward allocation to each player is such
that it is proportional to the contribution measure and also large enough to prevent them from breaking
away from the grand coalition.
The central agency mediating the process could use the theorem to check if an optimal outcome is possible
and if so, use it to allocate rewards to the participating players appropriately. It is also not difficult to see
that the theorem implies that an optimal outcome, if it exists, is unique.
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7 Suboptimal Outcomes
The optimal outcome for a group of n players may not exist given a particular characteristic function
and contribution measure indicated by the Shapley value. That is, there may be no outcomes satisfying
Theorem 6. This implies that in a data sharing process, the central mediator may not find an allocation of
the final reward such that all players regard it as fair and stable at the same time.
Nevertheless, there are still suboptimal outcomes which are of interest to us; in particular, since having
a stable and proportional solution payoff is necessary and sufficient for an optimal outcome, we can
restrict our analysis on suboptimal outcomes with the following solution payoffs:
• a solution payoff which is stable but not proportional
• a solution payoff which is proportional but not stable
Analysis of these two classes of suboptimal outcomes gives us an idea on how to derive a suboptimal
outcome which is amenable to the players when an optimal one is not achievable. As a mediator promoting
the data sharing process between players, a government agency can derive a suboptimal outcome with
some but not all desirable properties and perhaps still convince the players to continue collaborating in the
data-sharing process, especially if the suboptimal outcome does not violate stability or proportionality too
much.
7.1 Stable but not Proportional outcome
This outcome implies that each player will receive a reward that ensures he is not incentivised by larger
rewards elsewhere to leave the grand coalition. However, some players may receive a reward that is
not proportional to his relative contribution and if players can tolerate some disproportionality, then this
outcome is still acceptable.
Let < φ1, ..., φn > be the shapley value of the agents arranged in ascending order. Proportionality holds
between the payoffs xi, xj of any two players i and j if φiφj =
xi
xj
. Hence, if proportionality cannot be
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achieved in a stable outcome, we need a metric to measure the degree of proportionality violation in a
given payoff vector and select the stable outcome which violates this metric the least.
The concept of proportionality deviation is widely studied in proportional representation systems such as
allocation of parliament seats[2]. For example, we can measure the sum of pairwise absolute proportion-
ality violations between the reward received by all players:
Deviationsum =
∑
i,j∈N
∥∥∥∥∥φiφj − xixj
∥∥∥∥∥
p
(6)
This certainly is not the only available deviation measure. One alternative can be the max individual
deviation from proportionality. This measure is useful if we assume agents are able to tolerate some
deviation from proportionality (a certain level of unfairness):
Deviationmax = max
∥∥∥∥∥φiφj − xixj
∥∥∥∥∥
p

i,j
(7)
Hence, finding a stable solution with the lowest deviation measure can be formulated as the following
optimisation problem:
min
x1,...,xn
DeviationMeasure (8a)
subject to xi ≥ v
⋃
j≤i
j
 , (8b)
additional constraints. (8c)
Objective function (8a) represents a deviation measure such as (6) or (7); constraint (8b) represents the
solution payoff’s stability constraint, since we need to outcome to be stable; constraints (8c) represents
additional constraints which may be required if one wishes to enforce certain additional Fairness proper-
ties (Symmetry, Order Preserving, Null Player), since without which, a non-proportional solution may
not necessarily guarantee these properties.
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We acknowledge that finding an appropriate deviation measure is a non-trivial task as there are drawbacks
to different deviation measures ([2] mentions 19 different kinds of proportionality deviation indices!); for
example, measure (5) may assign large disproportional reward to a single player while measure (6) yields
non-unique solutions. As such, the central agency in the data sharing process needs to design a deviation
measure appropriate to reconcile a reasonable non-proportional outcome. However, empirical results at
the end of the paper show that Deviationsum gives reasonable outcomes.
7.2 Proportional but not stable outcome
A proportional but not stable outcome implies that while the reward given to each player is fair, some
players may be incentivised to break away from the grand coalition for better rewards. To tackle this
realistically in real life, the central agency must first find out how ”far away” the proportional solution is
from each player’s lower bounds of stability.
Definition 7. -Stability Let < x1, ..., xn > be the solution payoff to the agents, then this solution payoff
is -stable if for all C ⊆ N , there exists i ∈ C such that xi ≥ (v(C)− )
Notice Definition 7 is identical to the stability definition apart from the a deduction of  in the lower
bound. If  > 0, then we can understand  as the penalty each player pays for deviating from the grand
coalition to form a sub-coalition. As such, when a solution is -stable, if players have to pay a penalty
larger than  to break off from the grand coalition, then these players will remain in the grand coalition
because they will be unable to reap higher rewards elsewhere after paying the penalty to leave.
Instead of being viewed as a penalty,  can also be viewed as additional compensation to incentivise players
to stay in the grand coalition. The central agency could try to give additional benefits equivalent to  to
ensure players remain in the grand coalition (of course, this requires agencies and players to discuss what
denomination these benefits come in). The following corollary allows one to find this .
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Corollary 7.1. Let < x1, x2, ..., xn > be a proportional but not stable payoff vector. Define
di =

0 if xi ≥ v(
⋃
j≤i j)
v(
⋃
j≤i j)− xi otherwise
Then the payoff vector is -stable if  ≥ max
i
(di).
Proof. Given any solution payoff < x1, ..., xn >, since for any subcoalition C, there exists i such that
C ⊆ ⋃j≤i j and thus v(C) ≤ v(⋃j≤i j) by the monotonicity of v(.). It follows directly that for every
agent k and every subcoalition C with k being the highest indexed agent belonging to this subcoalition,
 ≥ max
i
(di) ≥ v(C)− xk −→ xk ≤ (v(C)− ).
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8 Sensitivity Analysis
Given that an optimal outcome is decided for a modified game where players have received a learnt model
of certain value, there can be many elements that influence the process retrospectively. Sensitivity analysis
allows us to investigate how sensitive the optimal outcome is towards such changes. In particular, we wish
to investigate if an outcome will remain optimal with such changes. Even if such perturbations have not
occurred, the central agency can perform sensitivity analysis pre-emptively to investigate how robust the
current optimal outcome is towards possible marginal changes in the future.
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of two possible scenarios
For example, one may realise retrospectively that a segment of a player’s data is unusable due to privacy
concerns and needs to be removed from the model created (leading to a marginal decrease in contribution
of that player); on the other hand, a player could have his relative contribution increased marginally by a
constant amount because he was able to offer some non-data related help in the data sharing process (e.g
offering GPU processing power).
In addition, new players may enter the collaboration process. While we can reinstate the entire game with
an additional player, the process to calculate the Shapley value of all players again using v(.) requires us
to pool the data in 2n subsets, making the process time consuming. As such, if an expert can estimate
the marginal contribution of the new player, we show in the following section that we can estimate if an
optimal outcome is still possible without complex recalculations.
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8.1 Inclusion of an new agent
First, we estimate the new agent’s contribution relative to existing agents using some expert opinion (mak-
ing educated guess based on some features surrounding the data set or the data provider). Second, we esti-
mate how much each coalition’s value changes due to the inclusion of the new agent. For the first estimate,
we let the index of the new agent be new and introduce φnew to the existing contribution vector (whilst
preserving the ascending order of the vector): < φ1, φ2, ..., φn > becomes< φ1, φ2, ..., φnew, ..., φn >. For
the second estimate, it is computationally expensive to derive the value of each subcoalition containing
new agent new; for ease of computation, we assume that for every subcoalition C in the original group
of agents, v′(C ∪ new) ≈ v(C) + φnew. This implies the marginal increase in a value of a subcoalition
by agent new is the same and leads to an overall relative contribution φnew, as calculated by the shapley
value formula.
Let the new grand coalition, N ′ = (N ∪ new), contain n+ 1 players. Hence, v′(N ′) = v′(N ∪ new) ≈
v(N) + φnew. Also assume the current outcome containing the payoff vector < x1, ..., xn > is stable,
proportional and thus optimal. We use w to indicate index of agents with lower contribution than new and
s to indicate index of agents with higher contribution than new.
Theorem 8. A stable and proportional solution, and thus an optimal outcome, is still possible with a
new player with marginal contribution φnew to all existing subcoalitions if and only if φnew satisfies the
following conditions:
∀s, φsv(N) + φnew
φmax
≥ v
⋃
j≤s
j
∖
new
+ φnew,
φnew
v(N) + φnew
φmax
≥ v(
⋃
j<new
j) + φnew
(9)
Proof. Theorem 8 stems directly from optimality conditions in Theorem 6. For the first inequality in (9),
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in a game with a new player with φnew, an optimal outcome is possible if and only if
∀s, xs = φsv
′(N ′)
φmax
≥ v′(
⋃
j≤s
j) (Theorem 6)
⇐⇒ φsv(N) + φnew
φmax
≥ v′(
⋃
j≤s
j) (Estimation of v′ on the left)
⇐⇒ φsv(N) + φnew
φmax
≥ v
⋃
j≤s
j
∖
new
+ φnew (Estimation of v′ on the right)
(10)
The proof is identical for the second inequality in (9).
Notice that all terms except φnew in the above theorem is already computed in the original game. Hence,
all we have to do is check if φnew satisfies the inequalities. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that if
an outcome is already optimal, the entry of a new player does not influence the optimality conditions on
existing players with lower relative contributions than the new player.
8.2 Perturbation of contribution of one particular player
Next, we analyse the case where all subcoalitions containing a particular player i is changed by a constant
value. As mentioned, this may occur when the central agency retrospectively needs to perturb the value of
one player’s data due to privacy concerns or if we retrospectively realise that a segment of a player’s data
is corrupted. Again, we make an estimation of the new value generated by all coalitions containing player
i in the following manner: let v′(C) = v(C) + δ for all coalition C containing agent i. Then this implies a
linear shift in player i’s shapley value: φnewi = φi + δ (by definition of shapley value). Also assume that δ
is such that the order of relative contribution of agents does not change and the current outcome containing
the payoff vector < x1, ..., xn > is already optimal.
For a particular agent of index k, let dk = φkφmaxv(N) − v(
⋃
j≤k j) ≥ 0, which always holds because the
current soluton is optimal. Again, we use w to indicate index of agents with lower contribution than i and
s to indicate index of agents with higher contribution than i.
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Theorem 9. A stable and proportional solution, and thus an optimal outcome, is still possible under
φnewi = φi + δ for player i if and only if δ satisfies the following conditions:
∀w, δ ≥ −φmax
φw
dw,
∀s, δ ≤ dsφmax
φmax − φs ,
δ2 + (φi + v(N)− φmax)δ + diφmax ≥ 0,
(11)
Proof. We prove all three inequalities in Theorem 9 in order. An optimal outcome is possible under new
conditions where player’s i’s contribution is perturbed by δ if for the first inequality:
∀w, xw = φw v(N
′)
φmax
≥ v′(
⋃
j≤w
j) (Theorem 6)
⇐⇒ φw v(N) + δ
φmax
≥ v(
⋃
j≤w
j) (Estimation of v′)
⇐⇒ φw v(N)
φmax
− v(
⋃
j≤w
j) ≥ − φw
φmax
δ
⇐⇒ dw ≥ − φw
φmax
δ (By definition of dw)
⇐⇒ δ ≥ −φmax
φw
dw
(12)
For the second inequality:
∀s, xs = φsv(N
′)
φmax
≥ v′(
⋃
j≤s
j) (Theorem 6)
⇐⇒ φsv(N) + δ
φmax
≥ v(
⋃
j≤s
j) + δ (Estimation of v′)
⇐⇒ φsv(N)
φmax
− v(
⋃
j≤s
j) ≥ − φs
φmax
δ + δ
⇐⇒ ds ≥ (− φs
φmax
+ 1)δ (By definition of ds)
⇐⇒ δ ≤ φmax
φmax − φsds
(13)
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Lastly, for the third equality:
xi = (φi + δ)
v(N ′)
φmax
≥ v′(
⋃
j≤i
j) (Theorem 6)
⇐⇒ (φi + δ)v(N) + δ
φmax
≥ v(
⋃
j≤i
j) + δ (Estimation of v′)
⇐⇒ φiv(N)
φmax
− v(
⋃
j≤i
j) +
φiδ + δv(N) + δ
2
φmax
≥ δ
⇐⇒ di + φiδ + δv(N) + δ
2
φmax
≥ δ (By definition of di)
⇐⇒ diφmax + φiδ + δv(N) + δ2 ≥ δφmax
⇐⇒ δ2 + (φi + v(N)− φmax)δ + diφmax ≥ 0
(14)
To make sense of the inequalities presented in Theorem 9. We first notice that in the trivial case where
δ = 0, each inequality holds because dk ≥ 0 for any k.
Furthermore, when δ > 0 (when the contribution of a player is increased), then the first inequality is true
because the right expression in the last line of (12) is always negative; the third inequality also holds true
because the quadratic inequality on the last line of (14) has positive coefficients. This implies that we only
have to check whether the second inequality holds true when δ > 0.
Lastly, when δ < 0 (when the contribution of a player is decreased), the second inequality holds true;
that is, we do not have to worry about infeasibility of payoffs to players with lower contribution than the
perturbed player. For sanity check, we also notice that there exists some δ < 0 such that the first inequality
holds true in the last line of (12) since the right term is negative. Lastly, it is easily verifiable that the third
inequality, the quadratic inequality δ2 + (φi + v(N)− φmax)δ+ diφmax ≥ 0 holds true for some values of
δ < 0 because the coefficients are all non-negative.
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9 Experiments
Let Di be the dataset held by player i. We emulate a multi-party machine learning process through the
use of one-dimensional synthetic datasets D1, D2, . . . , D7 held by 7 data providers and demonstrate the
properties and outcomes mentioned in our paper. In particular, we demonstrate the following:
1. Desirable properties of the Shapley value in measuring the contribution of each player’s dataset
based on two different characteristic functions - Fisher Information and Mutual Information.
2. Optimality of outcomes induced by these characteristic functions (i.e is there a fair and stable way
to reward the players?)
3. Deriving a suboptimal outcome when an optimal outcome is not achievable.
4. Will an optimal outcome still be achievable if we perturb the contribution of one player marginally?
In addition to demonstrating the above, we also offer some intuitive and useful insights to various obser-
vations made in the experiments with regards to the data sharing process. We also explain why we select
Fisher Information and Mutual Information as characteristic functions over other alternatives.
9.1 Introducing two different characteristic function
As mentioned previously, the characteristic function v(.) used to measure the value of predictive model
created should be reasonable and context dependent. One immediate idea that one has with regards to eval-
uating models is to evaluate its performance with a test data set. While this seems promising in evaluating
the power of each data provider’s data set, this is not always achievable in reality because it is non-trivial
to gather a test data set is truly representative of inputs that future predictions will be based on. Further-
more, the central agency may not have access to such data. Instead, it may be more favourable to rely on
certain statistical measures to evaluate the level of uncertainty associated with the learnt predictive models.
We introduce two different characteristic functions, Fisher Information and Mutual Information, which
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are both deeply rooted in probability. First, we give a brief introduction of these functions and discuss
their appropriateness in valuing predictive models.
9.1.1 Fisher Information
Fisher Information [6] measures the amount of information that an observed data carries about the param-
eter θ used to model the data. In particular, the Fisher Information of a set of data points gives us an idea
about the variance of an unbiased parameter estimate generated from these data points, directly allowing
us evaluate the uncertainty surround the predictive model (which comprises of these parameters). Tradi-
tionally, statisticians have used Fisher Information to design experiments to ensure estimated parameters
lie within a small confidence interval.
Definition 10. Let f(X; θ) be the probability density function for random variable(s) X conditional on a
true parameter θ. Then provided f(X; θ) is twice differentiable and under some regularity conditions, the
Fisher Information is defined as I(θ;X) = −E
[
∂2
∂θ2
log f(X; θ)
∣∣∣ θ]
The more interesting result follows from the derivation of the Cramer Rao bound after I(θ) is derived,
which lower bounds the precision that we can estimate parameter θ.
Definition 11. Let θˆ be any unbiased estimator of θ derived from observed data X . Then Cramer Rao
bound states that V ar(θˆ) ≥ 1I(θˆ;X) , where the equality holds when the estimated parameter is efficient.
This bound implies that when estimating parameters, maximising the Fisher Information is equivalent
minimising the smallest attainable variance about an estimated parameter. In fact, in many estimators, the
equality holds.
In the context of a multi-party machine learning process, we can derive the Fisher Information of a set of
data to derive the smallest attainable variance of the estimated parameter; a higher Fisher Information for
a group of players’ data implies possibly less uncertainty. This allows us to define, for any coalition C of
players with combined dataset DC , v1(C) = I(θ;DC).
In Linear Regression of the form y = xT θ + , where  ∼ N (0, σ2I), for a dataset DC containing n
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observed input and output values (Xi;Yi) with noise σi:
v1(C) = I(θ;DC) =
n∑
i=1
E(XTi Xi)
σi
(15)
We notice that v1(D1) + v1(D2) = v1(D1 ∪D2) for any two datasets D1 and D2. This implies that v1(.)
is an additive and monotonic characteristic function. In fact, the variance of the estimated parameter is
equals the reciprocal of v1(.) in Linear Regression.
9.1.2 Mutual Information
Mutual Information measures the reduction in uncertainty regarding model parameters when one has ac-
cess to a set of data D. Even though it shares a similar idea with Fisher Information in that both gauge
the value of data based on uncertainty of parameters, Mutual Information accounts for the prior uncer-
tainty regarding the parameters. One may prefer to use Mutual Information if one has some idea what the
”inherent uncertainty” associated with the model parameters is.
Definition 12. TheMutual Information between two continuous variables (A,B) is defined asM.I(A,B) =∫
Y
∫
X
p(X,Y )(x, y) log
(
p(X,Y )(x, y)
pX(x) pY (y)
)
dx dy,
In a Bayesian Linear Regression setting, let a dataset DC contain n output values (Xi, Yi) (represented by
X ∈ Rn×p, where p is the number of parameters) with noise δi associated with each observation i. Assume
δ ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix with diagonals = δi and Σprior is the prior covariance of parameters. Then
we have:
v2(C) = M.I(θ,DC) = 0.5log|Σprior||Σ−1prior +XTσ−1X| (16)
We notice that v2(.), unlike v1(.), is not additive but still monotonic.
35
9.2 Experiment results
We first synthesise one-dimensional data held by seven different players, shown in Figure 5. The legend
also shows the distribution of inputs X of the data held by each player, along with the output noise δ
associated with each player. Notice player 1 holds a single datapoint at the origin and player 3 and 4 hold
datapoints at similar input spaces.
Figure 5: Data held by different players
9.2.1 Shapley value
We then derive the shapley value φi, our contribution metric, for each player i, based on v1(.) and v2(.)
in Table 1. Because v1(.) and v2(.) hold different interpretations towards the value of data, we observe
that even though both valuations preserve the players’ order of contribution, v1 gives much larger disparity
between players’ contribution as compared to v2. This can be inferred directly from the functions’ def-
initions. As observed from Equation (15), v1(.) regards the value of 3 datapoints (sampled from similar
36
locations and with equal noise level) to have 3 times the value of 1 datapoint; this leads to large ratios be-
tween the players’ contribution. On the other hand, v2(.)’s formulation in Equation (16) gives diminishing
returns when more data is included; this leads to smaller ratio between the players’ contribution.
φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7
v1 0 162 500 501 1007 3003 3868
v2 0.002 1.404 1.613 1.617 1.884 2.314 2.327
Table 1: Shapley value based on two different valuation function v1 and v2
Despite the differences in interpretation and contribution values obtained from both characteristic func-
tions, we notice some similarities when they derive the shapley value φ:
1. Player 1 is a null player with a single data point (0, 0), which is generally useless in estimating the
model parameter. Hence, both characteristic functions calculate φ1 as close to zero.
2. Player 3 and Player 4 hold almost identical data (sampled from the same distribution) and thus φ3
and φ4 are almost identical for both characteristic functions.
3. The order of player’s contribution is the same for both characteristic functions.
As such, despite differences in v1(.) and v2(.), they both offer some intuitive and desirable properties
when deriving the contribution measure (these properties generally relate to how appropriately fair we
are evaluating players’ contribution). When generating an appropriate level of rewards to the players
based on this contribution measure later, we will see that such desirable properties will be passed onto the
outcomes.
9.2.2 Characteristic functions affect optimality of outcomes
Definition 4 and Proposition 5 defines the space of proportional and stable solution respectively. Using
these definitions, we show the lower bound for stability for each player (recall that stability is defined by
lower bounds on the reward given to each player in Proposition 5) and the proportional solution for v1(.)
and v2(.) respectively in Figure 6. Moreover, Theorem 6 directly allows us to check if an optimal outcome
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is possible based on whether the proportional solution is stable; hence, Figure 6 also showcases whether
the outcome is optimal for both characteristic functions.
The choice of an appropriate characteristic function should not be motivated by whether said function is
able to achieve an optimal outcome. The outcome, whether optimal or not, is simply the result from a
function choice. The choice of a particular function to value a model should still depend on its theoretical
or practical appropriateness.
Figure 6: Stablility bound and Proportional solution for v1 and v2
We immediately notice the following differences between the solutions induced by two different charac-
teristic functions:
1. For v1(.), we see that for each player, the proportional reward given (red bars) is larger or equals to
his own lower stability bound (blue dotted lines). Hence by Theorem 6, the payoff vector indicated
by the red bars to the players is an optimal outcome; notice that player 3 and 4 enjoy equal amount
of reward because they contributed data of similar value and player 1 receives no reward.
2. For v2(.), we notice that the proportional solution payoff for Player 2,3,4 and 5 is lower than the
stability lower bound defined by Proposition 5. Hence, the proportional solution is not stable and
an optimal outcome is not achievable.
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As such, if the data providers and central agency agree to use v1(.) as the characteristic function used
to evaluate the value of a model, then an optimal outcome can be achieved in the data sharing process.
However, only suboptimal outcomes can be achieved with v2(.)
To intuitively explain why v2(.) does not allow an optimal outcome, notice that the inequality in The-
orem 6 (which checks if an optimal outcome is possible): φi v(N)φn ≥ v(
⋃
j≤i j) most likely holds if the
contribution of player i, φi, is not much less than the combined value of the model created by players
with lower or equal contribution as player i. In other words, if a player’s data is generally useful (dictated
by how much the player’s data marginally increases the value of different coalitions of players) to every
coalition, then his relative contribution should not be too small. In the larger picture, we need this inequal-
ity to hold for every player, suggesting that an optimal outcome is possible only when the players’ data
is generally equally useful to all different coalitions. Notice that v2(.), Mutual Information, in Bayesian
Linear Regression is a metric that values addition of data less when there is already a lot of data present;
thus, the marginal addition of player’s data to larger groups of players is generally not very useful, causing
the inequality to be violated and the optimal outcome to be not achievable. On the other hand, Fisher
Information values datapoints additively without diminishing contribution, making players’ data generally
useful for every coalition and allowing the optimal outcome to be achievable.
9.2.3 Settling for a suboptimal outcome
To further demonstrate the analysis on suboptimal outcomes in Section 7, we focus on the case where
the central agency, upon finding that an optimal solution cannot achieved, attempts to seek a suboptimal
outcome which is still stable. This coincides with the outcome raised in Section 7.1, where players still re-
ceives a ”somewhat proportional” reward (defined by a deviation measure). Since v2(.) cannot achieve an
optimal outcome, we demonstrate the suboptimal outcome based on Deviationsum minimisation (Equa-
tion 8a) in Figure 7.
From Figure 7, one notices that the suboptimal outcome (green line) is stable and preserves certain level
of proportionality between players. For example, player 1, a null player, continues to receive zero reward,
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Figure 7: Suboptimal outcome (green line) based on Deviationsum minimisation
whereas player 3 and 4 still receive the same level of reward in the suboptimal outcome. However, the
rewards given to other players are not proportional to their relative contribution anymore.
It is easy to see that a suboptimal outcome which compromises proportionality in return for stability will
always yield higher reward for players. This is because the proportional reward allocation is not stable and
thus we have to increase the reward given to achieve stability.
9.2.4 Perturbation of contribution of one particular player
We would also like to demonstrate how Theorem 9 allows us to check if an optimal outcome is still
achievable given that the contribution of one player (with index i) changes marginally. Recall that this
implies the following:
v′(C) = v(C) + δ for all coalition C containing agent i
φnewi = φi + δ
(17)
For the rest of the section, we assume that δ > 0, implying that the contribution of a data provider has
marginally increased (due to addition of better data or denoising). From Theorem 9, we only have to
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check if the following holds true for all players with higher contribution (φ) than player i:
δ ≤ dsφmax
φmax − φs ∀s ∈ {s
: φs > φi} (18)
In the given example, assume that we would like to marginally change player 4’s contribution according
to expression (17) based on characteristic function v1(.). Then, we simply check if the following three
inequalities (for player 5,6 and 7) hold:
δ ≤ d5φmax
φmax − φ5
δ ≤ d6φmax
φmax − φ6
δ ≤ d7φmax
φmax − φ7
(19)
Omitting the arithmetic derivation, the three inequalities can be summarised to the inequality condition:
0 < δ ≤ 249.4 for the given synthetic dataset we created and v1(.). Hence, the optimal outcome is still
achievable if and only if the marginal contribution of player 4 is increased not more than 249.9. We set δ
to 200 and 400 and display the outcomes in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8: Outcomes when player 4’s contribution is increased by δ = 200 and δ = 400
As expected, since δ = 200 satisfies the inequality condition, the outcome is still optimal on the left,
whereas when δ = 400 violates the inequality condition, the outcome is no longer optimal (the red circle
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highlights that player 5’s proportional payoff is not stable, and hence an optimal outcome is not achievable)
on the right.
9.3 Extensions on other machine learning models
9.3.1 Logistic Regression for classification problems
Similar to Linear Regression, the Fisher Information for a Logistic Regression model is well defined and
indicative of the variance of the estimated parameters as well. The derivation [16] is well known and we
summarise the results below.
Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θp)T ∈ Rp be the model parameters. For the dataset D = {(xt, yt)} with n data points,
the likelihood of a Logistic Regressionmodel is as follows:
f(y|x, θ) = P (y + 1|x, θ)) = 1
1 + e−θT x
(20)
Then the Fisher Information (in matrix form since we have more than one parameter now) has en-
tries:
I(θ) = XTWX (21)
where we have X as the data set in matrix form and defined the n× n diagonal matrix:
W = diag
(
e
∑p
j=0 θjx1j
(1 + e
∑p
j=0 θjx1j)2
, . . . ,
e
∑p
j=0 θjxnj
(1 + e
∑p
j=0 θjxnj)2
)
(22)
We can use the sum of diagonals, (XTWX)jj , of the Fisher Information matrix as the characteristic
function associated to a set of data, since large diagonal entries correspond to smaller uncertainty about
one of the parameters using the Cramer Rao Bound (Definition 11)
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9.3.2 Neural Networks
For neural networks with softmax or sigmoid output layers (whose output can be viewed as a likelihood),
the Fisher Information and Mutual Information are also well defined for each parameter within the net-
works. However, due to large number of parameters in modern neural networks, it may be impractical to
perform large matrix arithmetic for these measures.
Agencies can resolve this by adopting a pre-trained neural network and only train the parameters on the last
few layers, greatly reducing the number of parameters in question (of course, this requires the pretrained
model to be trained on a similar task).
9.4 Extension on real life data
We extend the data sharing process to a real life data set consisting of breast cancer tumour diagnosis
[15]. Such data can be held in small sets separately by a few hospitals, and our data sharing process
investigates their contribution and rewards when they work together. The data is labeled with a binary
value indicating whether a tumour is malignant based on various attributes of its appearance such as
perimeter and smoothness. We first train a neural network using a small subset of data to simulate a pre-
trained neural network with two hidden layers of 6 hidden units each. Our data sharing process learns 4
parameters (3 parameters for each unit in the exposed layer and 1 offset parameter) associated with the
last layer in a Logistic Regression setting. Figure 9 highlights the neural network structure.
Hence, although the breast cancer data set has 10 features, the neural network transforms it into a 3
dimensional data set in the first 2 layers. This transformed data is then trained over a Logistic Regression
model in the final layer. To further demonstrate that some data points in the 3 dimensional space is more
useful than others, we use the trace of the Fisher Information matrix as our characteristic function in a
Logistic Regression setting with I(θ) = XTWX defined in Equation (21).
The expression tells us that I(θ) has large diagonal entries when W , a diagonal matrix, has large diagonal
entries. Equation (22) further implies that each diagonal entry corresponds to pˆ(1 − pˆ) of a contributed
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Figure 9: Pre-trained neural network with the data sharing process done over the last layer
data point, where pˆ is the output of the Logistic Regression model for that data point. Thus, the diagonal
entry is large when the corresponding data point contributed lies close to the decision boundary of the
learnt Logistic Regression model.
As such, if the Fisher Information is used as the characteristic function used to gauge the value of data, data
points which lie close to the learnt decision boundary will have higher value (Figure 10). To demonstrate
this, we assume 3 hospitals each with the same number of data points. They hold data points in 3 different
regions:
• Hospital A holds only data points which lies near the boundary (0.25 < pˆ < 0.75)
• Hospital B holds data points which can be moderately far from the boundary (0.1 < pˆ < 0.9)
• Hospital C holds data points which can be very far from the boundary (0.05 < pˆ < 0.95)
We see that randomly sampling data points for each player at different regions of the feature space does
indeed give different level of contribution in the data sharing process. To calculate whether the outcome
is optimal in terms of the model awarded to each hospital, one applies Theorem 6 based on the given
Shapley value of each hospital. In this case, we assume the data set is divided amongst the three hospital
(around 200 data points each) such that each holds equal number of data points but of different quality. It
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Figure 10: Varying importance (based on Fisher Information) of real life data after neural network trans-
formation
turns out, fortunately, the outcome is optimal (proportional and stable):
Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C
φ (contribution) 317 1369 2801
Reward 508 2194 4488
Table 2: Shapley value based on two different valuation function v1 and v2
We observe that each hospital receives a better model than if it had worked alone. This implies the data
sharing process creates higher quality model for each participating hospital and is desirable for society at
large.
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Figure 11: Shapley value of each hospital based on Fisher Information
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10 Future Work
10.1 Choosing reasonable characteristic functions
Choosing a sound characteristic function to measure players’ contribution in a data-sharing process is
crucial in calculating contribution and generating fair reward for each player. In corporate practice, players
and agencies may find it inconvenient to use complicated measures (such as Fisher Information and Mutual
Information) due to the lack of understanding of their theoretical interpretations. This may require some
domain experts to be involved in such data sharing projects.
From a theoretical stand, it would be desirable to categorise characteristic functions into classes based on
certain function properties (e.g monotonicity, submodularity, superadditivity). We can then study what
outcomes are possible for different classes of functions. This is useful because when faced with a new
characteristic function, we can try to see if such a function falls into any of these function classes and
immediately reach some known conclusions about the outcome.
10.2 Desirable suboptimal outcomes
This paper offered a few suboptimal outcomes when optimality cannot be achieved in Section 7. However,
it is not clear which outcomes are actually desired by participating data providers in real life. One may need
to rely on some empirical studies on the behaviour of players in terms of preference and rationality.
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11 Conclusion
This paper aimed to provide investigative insights towards the data sharing process with regards to players’
contribution evaluation and outcomes, which have not been studied much previously.
In this paper, we formulated the data sharing process as a new class of cooperative game with new defi-
nition of stability and fairness. Following which, we provided theoretical analyses on the various optimal
and suboptimal outcomes of such games in relation to any arbitrary characteristic function and explained
how these outcomes may be useful to a central mediator in the data sharing process in terms of explaining
the behaviours of participating players. Finally, we performed sensitivity analysis to study how sensitive
an optimal outcome is towards marginal changes.
Through experiments on synthetic real life datasets, we demonstrated the theoretical results introduced in
the paper, offered intuitive meaning behind them and explained how these results can be extended towards
different machine learning models.
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